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This article explores and challenges several common assumptions re-
garding what neutrality requires of us in assessing outcomes. In par-
ticular, I consider whether we should be neutral between different pos-
sible locations of the good: space, time, and people. I suggest that from a 
normative perspective we should treat space differently than time, and 
people differently than space and time. I also argue that in some cases 
we should give priority to people over space and time, and to time over 
space, but that, controversially, in some cases we should give priority to 
time over people.
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1. Introduction
It is common for philosophers and others to assume that, in certain 
contexts, morality requires us to be neutral with respect to space, time, 
and people. Following John Broome, we might refer to space, time, and 
people as different possible locations of the good (Broome 1991). Argu-
ably, classical utilitarians would have insisted that all that mattered 
was the sum total of utility that obtained in the world, not its location. 
So, in principle, classical utilitarians would have insisted not only on 
neutrality within each of the different possible locational categories, 
but between each of these locational categories.
* This article was originally given as a talk at the Value Conference sponsored
by The Ohio State University, Maribor University, and Rijeka University, held 
in Dubrovnik, Croatia, 11–15 June, 2018. I am grateful to the organizers, Justin 
D’Arms, Edin Lin, Boran Berčić, and Nenad Miščević, for inviting me to participate 
in that conference. I am also grateful to Nenad Miščević for inviting me to submit a 
written version of my talk for inclusion in this journal.
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Setting aside the special relations that give rise to agent-relative 
prerogatives and duties, I think there is surely something to be said in 
favor of the general proposition that morality requires us to be neutral 
with respect to space, time, and people. However, I believe it is much 
less clear what that is than many have assumed. In particular, I be-
lieve that many common assumptions about the relative status of the 
different possible locations of the good are dubious.
In this article, I shall briefl y try to illustrate some of my reasons 
for thinking this via a number of examples. The article is divided into 
three main sections. In Section 2, Space and time, I offer an example 
where I treat space and time differently for the purposes of rational 
deliberations. In Section 3, Space, time, people, and dominance prin-
ciples, I introduce three dominance principles with respect to space, 
time, and people. I note that, intuitively, it may seem that if we should 
be neutral between the different possible locations of the good, then if 
we accept one of the dominance principles we should accept all three. 
However, I note that in cases involving infi nity the three dominance 
principles confl ict, so that we cannot accept all three. This suggests 
that we must reject all three dominance principles, restrict their scope, 
or reject neutrality between the three different locations of the good. In 
Section 4, On the independent normative signifi cance of temporal value, 
I suggest that there may be independent value to fi lling different tem-
poral periods with high quality sentient life, beyond the extent to which 
doing so is good or bad for the sentient beings in those time periods.
Together, my arguments suggest that, from a normative perspec-
tive, we should treat space differently than time, and people differently 
than space and time. More specifi cally, they suggest that in in some 
cases we should give priority to people over space and time, and to time 
over space, but that, controversially, in some cases, we should, in es-
sence, give priority to time over people.
2. Space and time
Let’s start with the question of whether, from a normative perspective, 
we must treat space and time the same. Some people who do philos-
ophy of physics may think that to even raise this question reveals a 
deep misunderstanding of the nature of space and time, since modern 
physics supposedly tells us that space and time are inextricably linked 
in a single space/time continuum. However, my concern, here, is with 
whether we must treat space and time the same, in virtue of some neces-
sary normative principle, not with the empirical relation between space 
and time that may (or may not) in fact obtain in our world, but need not 
obtain in all possible worlds. Accordingly, to help us think about the 
questions that concern me here, we should assume, throughout this ar-
ticle, that we live in a world where a non-relativistic conception of space 
and time is true. This would have been the case if either a Newtonian or 
a pre-Newtonian conception of space and time had turned out to be true.
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Bearing the preceding assumption in mind, consider the following 
thought experiment.
Suppose I learn that our civilization will live in our galaxy another 
1000 years, and then die out. I also learn that in a distant galaxy an-
other civilization will exist for the same 1000 years and then die out. 
Suppose, further, that this is also so in a third distant galaxy, and a 
fourth. I fi nd this all quite interesting. Perhaps oddly, it is somewhat 
pleasing to me to learn that there are, in fact, advanced civilizations 
living in various galaxies far away. However, suppose I also learn that 
beyond the fourth galaxy there is nothing but cold, empty, space. This, 
too, I fi nd interesting. Yet, I must confess that learning that fact doesn’t 
bother me very much at all. Indeed, if someone said that events beyond 
the fourth galaxy were about to unfold which would make those distant 
reaches inhospitable to life forms in perpetuity, I wouldn’t think it es-
pecially important for our civilization to make signifi cant sacrifi ces, if 
it could, to prevent that from happening.
Suppose, on the other hand, I vary the story a bit. As before, I learn 
that civilization in our galaxy will die out in 1000 years, but I learn that 
after ours dies out another, wholly unrelated, civilization will arise and 
persist for 1000 years in a second galaxy far away, and that this will 
happen again a third and fourth time. But after that, I am told, there 
will be nothing but cold, empty, space, forever. For some reason, that 
knowledge would bother me a lot. Indeed, if I learned that events were 
about to unfold which would make the universe uninhabitable for any 
life forms 4000 years from now, unless our civilization made signifi cant 
sacrifi ces to prevent that from happening, I would feel quite strongly 
that we should do so. Moreover, I would feel that way even if I knew 
that our civilization was going to die out in 1000 years no matter what 
we did, and that any future civilizations would do nothing to advance 
or realize our particular dreams or goals.1
1 Samuel Scheffl er (2013) has argued that having descendants who will help 
realize some of our deepest hopes, projects, or ideals, helps to give our lives value and 
meaning that they would otherwise lack. Scheffl er’s views are entirely compatible 
with my own, and I am happy to accept them. But, they point to other reasons why 
one might be more concerned about the future than about what happens elsewhere 
in space than those I am trying to illuminate here. As my example makes plain, I 
believe that even if the future civilizations were wholly unrelated to our own, and 
would do nothing to further our particular hopes, projects, and ideals, I still believe 
that there would be strong reason to ensure that such civilizations would exist if 
they would have high quality lives. In addition, I believe that such reasons would be 
stronger than any we would have to ensure, were it possible, that such civilizations 
obtain elsewhere in space contemporaneous with our own.
Similarly, Jeff McMahan (personal communication, October 2, 2015) suggested 
a variety of considerations that might lead us, in general, to give greater weight to 
there being high quality sentient lives existing in the future, than to there being 
high quality sentient lives existing elsewhere in space. According to McMahan, these 
might include views we have about the importance of the preservation of value, 
views about the importance of progress, and views about the importance of greater 
diversity of experiences. My response to McMahan is threefold.
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My views here may ultimately be indefensible, but I don’t think 
they are idiosyncratic, and they reveal that I have an asymmetry in 
my thinking about space and time. Even if I know that the exact same 
number of sentient beings will exist in the two scenarios, and will fl our-
ish to the exact same extent, I respond to the two scenarios very dif-
ferently. The second scenario seems very bad indeed. The fi rst seems 
hardly bad at all. Thus, I think it very important that many times be 
fi lled with fl ourishing sentient beings. I think it much less important 
that many spaces be fi lled with fl ourishing beings. Of course, these re-
fl ections hardly constitute an argument for my view; but they reveal 
that I am treating space and time differently in my moral deliberations.
Let us vary the preceding example just a bit. Suppose that we had 
taken steps to ensure both that three distant planets in space were 
populated with advanced civilizations, and that each of the next three 
consecutive hundred year periods would also be populated with ad-
vanced civilizations. Suppose, next, that someone developed two pills, 
each of which would enable us to lead really fl ourishing lives for 120 
years, but with the following consequences. If we take the red pill, we 
won’t be able to populate any more distant planets in space. If we take 
the blue pill we won’t be able to populate any more hundred year pe-
riods after the next three. I believe that there would be little or no 
objection to taking the red pill, but very strong objection to taking the 
blue one. Here, again, I fi nd myself wanting to treat space and time dif-
ferently in my moral deliberations.
As discussed in note three, the objection to taking the blue pill that 
I have in mind here is independent of any of the ways in which future 
civilizations might help realize our projects or goals. To my mind, a 
principle reason for wanting high quality life to exist in the future is 
also a reason for wanting high quality life to exist in the past; namely 
that it is a very good thing for different time periods to be fi lled with a 
signifi cant number of sentient beings with high quality lives. That rea-
son is unrelated to any meaning or value that the existence of descen-
dants may sometimes help bestow on their ancestors. I don’t believe 
that there is a similarly strong reason to fi ll different locations in space 
with high quality lives.
First, as with what I said about Scheffl er’s view, I don’t regard my position as 
incompatible with McMahan’s. Depending on the details of the case, there could 
be more than one reason for valuing the existence of future civilizations over the 
existence of contemporaneous civilizations elsewhere in space. But second, in my 
examples, I wasn’t, in fact, assuming that there was greater diversity of experiences 
over time than across space, nor was I assuming that there would be progress 
between our current civilization and the future, unrelated, civilizations. Thus, 
my views about such cases weren’t, in fact, turning on such factors. Moreover, 
importantly, I note that the notions of preservation of value, and progress, have a 
temporal dimension built in to them, but not a spatial dimension. So, McMahan’s 
suggestions regarding those factors would, if correct, not be a rival to my own, but 
rather a further elucidation of some of the reasons why we should treat space and 
time differently for the purposes of practical reasoning.
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3. Space, time, people, and dominance principles
Suppose, for a moment, that we should dismiss my worries, and go 
along with the widely-held view that, except in the case of special re-
lations and special obligations, we should be neutral across all three 
dimensions of space, time, and people. A corollary of such a view would 
seem to be that if we accept a dominance principle with respect to one of 
these categories, we should accept a similar dominance principle with 
respect to the others. Consider, for example, the following three domi-
nance principles regarding utility.
Spatial Dominance Principle: for any two alternative outcomes, A and B, 
if A and B involve the same region of space, S, which is made up of a set 
of non-empty sub-regions of space, s1, …, sn, if A is better than B regarding 
utility in every sub-region of space, si, then A is better than B regarding 
utility.
Temporal Dominance Principle: for any two alternative outcomes, A and B, if 
A and B involve the same region of time, T, which is made up of a set of non-
empty sub-regions of time, t1, …, tn, if A is better than B regarding utility in 
every sub-region of time, ti, then A is better than B regarding utility.
Personal Dominance Principle: for any two alternative outcomes, A and B, 
if A and B involve the same people and A is better than B regarding utility 
for every person who will ever live, then A is better than B regarding utility.
Intuitively, many would fi nd each of the preceding dominance prin-
ciples plausible, and they might assume that if one of them is true the 
others must also be true. But this assumption is clearly false. To see 
this, consider Diagram 1.2
2 The following case is my own, but it was sparked by an example I fi rst heard 
during a discussion with John Broome, many years ago, which he called “Expanding 
Heaven and Expanding Hell.” Broome credited his example to James Cain (See Cain 
1995). Although my views about this topic were arrived at independently, other 
philosophers have developed similar arguments in order to make similar points. 
See, for example, Vallentyne (1993), Lauwers (1997) Vallentyne and Kagan (1997), 
Machina (2000), Lauwers and Vallentyne (2004), Bostrom (2011), and Campbell 
(2015).
Interestingly, while Cain uses an example similar to mine to arrive at the 
same conclusion that I do regarding the relative status of Personal and Temporal 
Dominance Principles for certain cases and contexts, Campbell produces a series 
of ingenious examples in order to show that, depending on one’s theory of personal 
identity, there will be other cases where the relative status of Personal and Temporal 
Dominance Principles would be the reverse of that for which Cain and I argue. I 
don’t favor the reductionist view of personal identity that would lead to Campbell’s 
results. However, many do, and for those who do, Campbell’s arguments are quite 
compelling.
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T1, S1   P1    Good Life (GL); T1, S1   P1 Bad Life    (BL);  
            P2, P3 Bad Life (BL)      P2,  P3 Good Life  (GL)
T2, S2   P1–3  GL; P4–9   BL T2, S2   P1–3  BL; P4–9   GL
T3, S3   P1–9  GL; P10–27 BL T3, S3   P1–9  BL; P10–27 GL
T4, S4   P1–27 GL; P28–81 BL T4, S4   P1–27 BL; P28–81 GL
 :  :
 :  :
 :  :
 O1  O2
Diagram 1.
O1 and O2 are two possible outcomes, in which the very same people, 
P1, P2, P3, etc. exist. In O1 there is one person, P1, living in time period 
one, and spatial region one, who has a good life, well above the level 
at which life ceases to be worth living; but, unfortunately, there are 
twice as many other people, P2 and P3, who have bad lives, well below 
the level at which life ceases to be worth living. In time period two, P1 
through P3 have moved to spatial region two, where they all enjoy good 
lives; but, unfortunately, in that time period, and at that location, twice 
as many other people, P4 through P9, have come into existence, and 
their lives are as bad as P2 and P3’s lives were during T1. In time period 
three, P1 through P9 have all moved to spatial region three, where they 
all enjoy good lives, but, unfortunately in that time and location, twice 
as many other people, P10 through P27, have come into existence, and 
their lives are as bad as P2 and P3’s lives were during T1. Outcome One 
continues to unfold, in this ever expanding manner, forever, with each 
time period lasting for one day, and each person living for 100 years to-
tal, before dying. Here, and later, we assume that the positive value of 
each good moment is the same, the negative value of each bad moment 
is the same, and that the two values sum to zero. So, by hypothesis, a 
life containing an equal number of moments of good and bad life will 
have a net value of zero, a life containing more moments of good life 
than bad will have a positive net value, and a life containing more mo-
ments of bad life than good will have a negative net value.
Outcome Two is analogous to, though the reverse of, Outcome One. 
In O2, there is one person, P1, living in time period one, and spatial re-
gion one, who has a bad life, well below the level at which life ceases to 
be worth living; but, fortunately, there are twice as many other people, 
P2 and P3, who have good lives, well above the level at which life ceases 
to be worth living. In time period two, P1 through P3 have moved to 
spatial region two, where they all suffer bad lives; but, fortunately, in 
that time period, and at that location, twice as many other people, P4 
through P9, have come into existence, and their lives are as good as 
P2 and P3’s lives were during T1. And so on. As before, Outcome Two 
continues to unfold, in this ever expanding manner, forever, with each 
time period lasting for one day, and each person living for 100 years 
total, before dying.
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How do Outcomes One and Two compare regarding utility? Com-
paring them spatial location by spatial location, or temporal location by 
temporal location, Outcome Two would be clearly better than Outcome 
One, in accordance with the Spatial and Temporal Dominance Prin-
ciples. This is because for every spatial region, Sn, and every temporal 
region, Tn, there will be twice as many people with good lives as with 
bad lives in Outcome Two, while there will be twice as many people 
with bad lives as with good lives in Outcome One.
So, should we conclude that Outcome Two really is better than Out-
come One regarding utility? I think not. This is because Outcome One 
is better than Outcome Two in accordance with the Personal Dominance 
Principle regarding utility. After all, by hypothesis, the same people ex-
ist in both outcomes, and they are all clearly better off in Outcome One, 
where they each suffer for only one bad day followed by 99 years and 
364 days of good life, than they are in Outcome Two, where they each 
fare well for only one day, followed by 99 years and 364 days of bad life.
In this example, we can accept the dominance principle regarding 
people, or we can accept the dominance principles regarding space and 
time, but we cannot do both. Here we have a proof that, unless we re-
ject all three dominance principles, in some cases, at least, we should 
not, and cannot, treat space and time the same way as we treat people. 
So, should we reject all three dominance principles? I don’t see why. In 
this case, at least, the Personal Dominance Principle clearly seems to 
support the correct answer!
The preceding argument suggests that for certain cases, at least, 
we should give priority to distributions of wellbeing across people over 
distributions of wellbeing across space and time. And earlier, I sug-
gested being more concerned about distributions of wellbeing through-
out time, than throughout space. The priority ranking of people, over 
time, over space, for some cases, at least, might be further buttressed 
by considering Diagram 2.
 …. T–4, T–3, T–2, T–1, T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, ….
 …. S–4, S–3, S–2, S–1, S0, S1, S2, S3, S4, ….
      O3 …. P–4–4, P–3–3, P–2–2, P–1–1, P00, P11, P22, P33, P44, ….
 …. T–3, T–2, T–1, T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, ….
 …. S–5, S–4, S–3, S–2, S–1, S0, S1, S2, S3, ….
      O4 …. Q–4–4, Q–3–3, Q–2–2, Q–1–1, Q00, Q11, Q22, Q33, Q44, ….
Diagram 2.
In Diagram 2, O3 and O4 are outcomes with an infi nite number of peo-
ple, Pi or Qj, with each person, located at a particular location in space, 
Sk, and a particular location in time, Tl, at a level corresponding to one 
of the integers. So, for example, in Outcome Three, person P0 is at level 
0, at temporal location 0 and spatial location 0, while in Outcome Four 
person Q–4 is at level –4, at temporal location –3 and spatial location –5. 
For the purposes of this example, I am assuming that the metaphys-
8 L.S. Temkin, Neutrality and the Relations between Locations
ics of space and time allow for the identifi cation of the same spatial 
and temporal locations across different possible outcomes, so that for 
each k and l, Sk corresponds to the very same location in space in each 
outcome, and Tl corresponds to the very same location in time in each 
outcome. If such an assumption is coherent, then Diagram 2 illustrates 
that the Spatial and Temporal Dominance Principles are incompatible 
with each other. So we can reject both, or limit their scopes, but we 
cannot simply accept both. This is because, as a careful examination 
reveals, in Diagram 2, Outcome Three is better than Outcome Four at 
every point in time, but Outcome Three is worse than Outcome Four at 
every point in space.
Now assume, temporarily, that the populations of the Outcomes 
Three and Four are wholly distinct. In that case, I can see why some-
one might claim that each outcome is equally good, since each involves 
an infi nite number of people, such that for each integer there is exactly 
one person whose level of wellbeing is accurately represented by that 
integer. If one reasoned in that way, then one would be rejecting both 
the Spatial Dominance Principle and the Temporal Dominance Prin-
ciple. However, my own judgment is that in this case we should accept 
the judgment yielded by the Temporal Dominance Principle, and reject 
the judgment yielded by the Spatial Dominance Principle. That is, in 
this case, I would judge Outcome Three as better than Outcome Four, 
since it is better at each moment in time and, to my mind, there is 
neither a compelling reason to ignore this consideration, nor a counter-
vailing reason outweighing it.
However, as the previous discussion makes plain, I believe that 
there could be a countervailing reason outweighing, or perhaps under-
mining, the Temporal Dominance Principle. In particular, if the same 
people would exist in both Outcome Three and Outcome Four, and they 
would each be better off in one of the outcomes than the other, then, 
in accordance with the Personal Dominance Principle, I would judge, 
in this particular case and context, the outcome in which they were all 
better off as better than the other outcome, regarding utility, regard-
less of how the two outcomes compared in accordance with either the 
Spatial or Temporal Dominance Principles.3
3 As the literature cited in note four reveals, many people have recognized that 
Dominance Principles fail in infi nite cases. And many others are suspicious of 
appealing to infi nite cases in thinking about normative issues. Given the diffi culty of 
grasping the infi nite intuitively, the latter attitude is understandable. Nevertheless, 
I think it is deeply mistaken. I believe that if one is careful, one can usefully 
consider infi nite cases when doing normative philosophy, and that there can be great 
philosophical payoff from doing so. I also believe that since it is very possible that 
we live in an infi nite universe, it would be deeply problematic if our moral principles 
were only plausible for, and applicable to, fi nite realms.
Unfortunately, the issues connected with this topic are too complex to pursue 
here. Still, I believe that the infi nite examples canvassed in this work are appropriate 
for the purposes to which I put them, and that we can usefully gain insight into 
this article’s topics by considering them. I might add that many people assume 
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4. On the independent normative 
signifi cance of temporal value
Many philosophers, economists, and others believe that the proper lo-
cations of value are people, and that considerations of time and space 
are only relevant insofar as they have an effect on the quality of differ-
ent people’s lives. But the considerations I have offered in support of 
giving greater priority to time over space belie that simple, natural, as-
sumption. Elsewhere, I have argued at great length in support of there 
being impersonal ideals, as well as personal ones.4 In particular, I have 
argued that many of the ideals that people value most, including such 
ideals as justice, equality, beauty, perfection, and truth, have value 
beyond the extent to which they are good or bad for people. I have also 
argued in favor of a Capped Model of Ideals, according to which there 
may be an upper limit to how good an outcome can be, regarding util-
ity, for any given period of time, so that once a large number of people 
exist who are already extremely well off, merely adding more people 
to the outcome with lives worth living won’t signifi cantly make the 
outcome better.5 I can’t repeat the arguments for these positions here. 
However, if, in fact, they are correct, they provide the theoretical basis 
for a rather surprising, and controversial, conclusion. To wit: while in 
the contexts previously discussed there was reason to give priority to 
people over times, in some contexts, there may be reason, in essence, to 
give priority to times over people.
To see this, consider Diagram 3.
that even if the Dominance Principles fail in infi nite cases, they succeed in fi nite 
cases. However, I believe that this intuitively plausible position is also mistaken, 
for reasons that I have given elsewhere and won’t repeat here. For reasons relevant 
to rejecting the Personal Dominance Principle, even in fi nite cases, see Temkin 
(1993, 2000: 126–161, 2003a; 2003b, and 2012). For reasons relevant to rejecting the 
Spatial and Temporal Dominance Principles, see Temkin (2012 and 2015).
4 See my Inequality, “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection,” 
“Egalitarianism Defended,” “Personal versus Impersonal Principles: Reconsidering 
the Slogan,” and Rethinking the Good.
5 At least if the additional people are no better off than those who already exist. I 
was initially led to advocate a Capped Model of Ideals by refl ecting on Derek Parfi t’s 
Repugnant Conclusion (Parfi t 1984: 388). For a detailed explication of the Capped 
Model of Ideals, and some of the considerations underlying it, see Chapter 10 of 
Rethinking the Good.
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   500 B.       500 B.                          1000 B.             500 B.     500B. 
      T1              T2                 T1              T2                 T1              T2                   T1           T2 
                  
                  I                                    II                                   III                                   IV 
Diagram 3.
Diagram 3 is different from Diagrams 1 and 2 in one important respect. 
In Diagram 3, the width of each rectangle represents the length of a 
time period, rather than the number of people existing in an outcome—
that number is given above each rectangle. Moreover, we assume, for 
the sake of the example, that in accordance with a Capped Model for 
Ideals, for any time period the duration of T1, 500 billion people, at any 
given level of wellbeing, would be enough to bring an outcome very near 
to the cap for how good an outcome can be, during that time period, by 
having lots of people with that level of wellbeing.
As drawn, Diagram 3 represents four possible outcomes. In Out-
come I, there are 500 billion people all at a very high level, spread out 
over a lengthy time period, T1. Unfortunately, in Outcome I, a second 
equally lengthy time period, T2, is utterly devoid of high quality sen-
tient life. In Outcome II, the very same 500 billion people who would 
exist in Outcome I exist at a slightly higher quality of life during time 
period T1. However, once again, unfortunately, time period T2 is utterly 
devoid of high quality sentient life. In Outcome III, an extra 500 billion 
people have been added to the temporal period T1, at the same level as 
those in Outcome II. But, once again, unfortunately, time period T2 is 
utterly devoid of high quality sentient life. Finally, in Outcome IV, the 
original 500 billion people occupy time period one at the level of those 
in Outcome I, and there are an extra 500 billion people who all exist in 
time period T2 at the very same level. Moreover, by hypothesis, these 
are the very same “extra” people who would have existed in Outcome 
III during time period T1 at a slightly higher level.
How do the different outcomes compare, all things considered? 
Drawing on the results presented previously, together with my view 
about how best to understand and interpret the Capped Model of Ide-
als—which I have only had time to barely mention, but not develop 
in this article—I would make the following judgments. I would judge 
Outcome II as better than Outcome I, since it is better for everybody. 
However, since it is only a little bit better for everyone, and I reject 
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a simple additive aggregationist model for ranking outcomes, I would 
judge that Outcome II isn’t a whole lot better than Outcome I.
Next, I would judge Outcome III as only slightly better than Out-
come II, and hence, like Outcome II, as only a little better than Out-
come I. This is an implication of the Capped Model of Ideals, given our 
assumption that the cap is already almost reached in Outcome II, for 
how good an outcome can be by having lots of people at that level, dur-
ing a time period the duration of T1. On that assumption, the Capped 
Model implies that merely adding another 500 billion people to the very 
same temporal region would not make a signifi cant difference to the 
overall goodness of an outcome. Hence, as indicated, Outcome III would 
not be signifi cantly better than Outcome II.
On the other hand, since I believe that it is very important that 
many regions of time be fi lled with fl ourishing beings, I would judge 
Outcome IV, where there are 500 billion fl ourishing beings in T2 as 
much better than Outcome I, where T2 is utterly devoid of high qual-
ity life. Unsurprisingly, then, I would also judge Outcome IV as better 
than Outcome’s II and III, which are only a little better than Outcome 
I in terms of what happens during time period T1, and which, like Out-
come I, have the signifi cant negative feature of being utterly devoid of 
high quality sentient life throughout the whole of time period T2.
But notice, by hypothesis, the very same people exist in Outcomes 
III and IV, and they are all better off, even if only slightly, in Out-
come III than in Outcome IV. So, my judgment that Outcome IV is 
better than Outcome III, all things considered, suggests that, in this 
context, I am, as it were, giving priority to time over people. This is 
a striking conclusion that many people will initially fi nd deeply im-
plausible.6 However, I believe that this conclusion is defensible, and 
that, on refl ection, it is neither surprising nor implausible. It is merely 
yet another manifestation of the fact that some ideals have impersonal 
value, in the sense that their realization can contribute to the goodness 
of outcomes, beyond the extent to which their realization is good for the 
sentient beings in those outcomes. In particular, this article’s consider-
ations refl ect the view that there can be signifi cant impersonal value to 
fi lling different periods of time with high quality life. Correspondingly, 
it shouldn’t be surprising that in some cases, such as the one depicted 
by Diagram 3, such impersonal value can outweigh the personal value 
of increasing individual wellbeing by a small amount.
6 Derek Parfi t once referred to a claim of this sort as The Absurd Conclusion 
(Parfi t 1984: 410–411). Arguably, underlying the plausibility of Parfi t’s ascription 
were both a welfarist view—which assesses the goodness of outcomes solely in terms 
wellbeing, thereby rejecting the relevance of impersonal ideals for assessing outcome 
goodness—and a standard view about what neutrality requires. As my claims here 
make plain, I believe that both views are dubious. For further arguments in support 
of this article’s claims and the view that The Absurd Conclusion isn’t, in fact, absurd, 
see Temkin (Forthcoming).
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5. Conclusion
Let me briefl y summarize my main claims. Setting aside any agent-
relative duties and permissions that may arise due to the special rela-
tions that sometimes obtain among different beings, most people agree 
that morality requires neutrality. There is, I believe, something deeply 
right about this. However, it is much less clear than many have sup-
posed what neutrality entails.
In particular, one might have presumed that morality requires us to 
be neutral both within, and between, each of the different possible loca-
tions of good: space, time, and people. While there may be some sense in 
which this is true, I have suggested that we need not, and should not, 
treat space, time, and people the same for the purposes of normative 
reasoning.
I have offered examples suggesting that in some cases we should 
give priority to time over space, and that it is more important that 
different temporal regions be fi lled with fl ourishing sentient beings 
than that different spatial regions be fi lled with fl ourishing beings. I 
have also shown that three intuitively plausible dominance principles 
confl ict in certain cases: a Spatial Dominance Principle, a Temporal 
Dominance Principle, and a Personal Dominance Principle. I have sug-
gested that when they confl ict I favor the judgment of the Temporal 
Dominance Principle over that of the Spatial Dominance Principle, and 
that in certain cases I favor the judgment of the Personal Dominance 
Principle over that of both the Spatial and Temporal Dominance Prin-
ciples. However, drawing on claims argued for elsewhere—that there 
can be impersonal ideals, as well as personal ideals, relevant for as-
sessing outcome goodness, and that we need something like a Capped 
Model of Ideals for evaluating outcomes—I also argued for the striking 
claim that in certain cases we should, as it were, give priority to times 
over people.
This article is very much a preliminary exploration, and I am acute-
ly aware that the speculative lines I have pursued will strike many 
as wild, implausible, and deeply wrongheaded. Nevertheless, I believe 
there is much to be learned about the nature of practical reasoning by 
taking these issues seriously; even if doing so may ultimately take us 
in directions other than those that I have stumbled towards in this 
article.7
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